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Abstract:  A stylised partial equilibrium model of an MNC is developed. The model 
incorporates key aspects of outsourcing in a world of falling trade costs. The multinational, 
with firm-specific capital operates in two countries that differ in factor prices; it produces 
final goods with firm specific capital but can source multiple intermediate goods internally 
from each subsidiary (produced with firm-specific capital and labour), or outsource them 
from domestic or foreign suppliers. There is a potential trade off between scale of final 
good production and scope of in-house component production. Trade liberalization can 
affect both country and organization choices of the firm’s component sourcing and final-
good production. We also use a previously unused data set on component trade of Toyota 
in Southeast Asia to conduct an empirical investigation informed by the model insights.    
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  1I. Introduction 
 
International trade and global FDI have been growing rapidly. From 2000 to 2005, world 
merchandise exports grew by 10 per cent per year (WTO, 2006). These trends have been 
accompanied by the growing fragmentation of production. Yeats (2001) finds that the share 
of trade in ‘parts’ and ‘components’ of machinery goods increased from 26 per cent of 
OECD exports in 1978 to 30 per cent in 1995.
 1 More recently, this trend is especially 
notable in East Asia, including China, ASEAN-4, NIE, and Japan. According to Ando and 
Kimura (2005), the share of machinery parts and components in the total exports of the 
region increased from 19 per cent to 30 per cent during the period 2000-03.  
 
Many studies have documented that much of trade in intermediate input and services is 
related to the global sourcing strategies of MNCs.
2  Falling trade costs and lowering of 
investment barriers among the members of integrating region may be a relevant fact 
accelerating the expansion of international production network.
3  
 
Global sourcing is not confined to intra-firm trade, but international outsourcing also 
contributes to the phenomenon.
4 This phenomenon has triggered extensive research geared 
towards understanding the changes in the trade and investment patterns of multinational 
firms. By its very nature, this phenomenon is of interest to researchers in international trade 
as well as to those in industrial organization and corporate strategy. A part of the literature 
focuses on firms’ decisions on vertical FDI and international fragmentation of production 
using international trade models (e.g. Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a, 1996b; Grossman and 
                                                 
1 Electric machinery and transport equipment accounts for the majority of trade in parts and components of 
machinery goods. 
2 See, e.g. Feenstra et al., 2000; Hanson et al., 2001 and 2005; Kleinert, 2003; and Swenson, 2004. 
3 For example, Hummels et al. (1998) find that the elimination of tariff reductions on automotive trade 
between the US and Canada in 1965 raised the share of total trade accounted for by vertical specialization 
from zero to 20 per cent in six years. 
4 The use of the term ‘outsourcing’ in the public debate has not been standardized. Outsourcing, generally, 
refers to transferring organizational controls over non-core operations from internal production to a third party 
(WTO, 2005). Outsourcing can be domestic or international. Domestic outsourcing involves buying services 
or material inputs from an unaffiliated firm in a country where the core operation is located. International 
outsourcing refers to importing services or intermediate inputs from an unaffiliated firm in another country. 
International outsourcing is a part of the term ‘offshoring’. Offshoring refers to procuring services or material 
inputs from a source in a foreign country (NAPA, 2006). Offshoring can be conducted in-house or at arms-
length. Thus, offshoring includes both international outsourcing and intra-firm trade. The term ‘(vertical) 
integration’ is the opposite of ‘outsourcing’. It means acquiring inputs or services from a related party. Note 
that ‘integration’, ‘in-house sourcing’, ‘insourcing’, ‘internal-sourcing’, and ‘intra-firm sourcing’ are 
sometimes used interchangeably. However, when this related party is located in a foreign country, the terms 
‘foreign direct investment (FDI)’ or ‘offshore integration’ or ‘intra-firm trade’ are used. 
  2Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Helpman, 1984 and 1985; Jones, 2000; Markusen, 1998 and 2005). 
International trade researchers have asked the questions: When would a firm choose to split 
the production process that was once centralized in a single country into sub-processes, and 
locate them in different countries? How is the set of traded components or ‘tasks’ 
determined? What are the effects on resource allocation, trade flows, welfare and factor 
prices?  
 
Another branch of the literature focuses on outsourcing in a corporate context using the 
industrial organizational (IO) literature. After Coase (1937), a path-breaking paper for 
understanding the firm-boundary, the key focus of the literature is the firm’s make-or-buy 
decision. The literature on make-or-buy decisions of the firm follows two leading theories: 
the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) of Williamson (1975, 1985), and the Property 
Rights Theory (PRT) of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). These 
frameworks enable IO economists to ask: When will a firm choose to make components 
and when will it buy them from an arms-length supplier?   
 
More recently, as offshore outsourcing has gained prominence, a synthesis of the two 
strands of literature has started to emerge.
5 Trade and IO researchers now address new 
questions: When will firms choose to outsource in a foreign county rather than at home? 
When will MNCs choose to integrate in a foreign country (FDI), rather than integrate at 
home? (e.g. Antràs, 2003 and 2005; Antràs and Helpman, 2004; Feenstra and Hanson, 
2005; Grossman and Helpman, 2002, 2003 and 2005; and McLaren, 2000. 
 
The existing models have often tended to be complex, incorporating contractual 
incompleteness, imperfect information, and matching problems that do not lend easily to 
empirical testing. Many models were very restrictive in their approaches, and dealt with the 
case where only a particular component can be outsourced, and did not allow for 
endogenous determination of the sets of components acquired by different modes and 
locations of outsourcing. Recent models have started to address some of these limitations 
by dealing with the case of multiple inputs or tasks (e.g. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 
2006). However, available models all have important limitations for understanding the 
MNC’s behaviour (and related intra-firm trade in components and output) when the 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Helpman (2006) and Spencer (2005) for comprehensive reviews. 
  3presence of MNC operations in different countries provides multiple sourcing options 
(offshore vs onshore; inside firm (subsidiary) vs outside supplier etc.) of multiple 
components or tasks, and involve international trade in final goods and inputs.   
 
In this paper, I develop a stylized model of an MNC operating in two countries that differ 
in factor endowments, and whose operations are undergoing changes in response to 
ongoing trade and investment liberalization. The model incorporates multiple components, 
make-or-buy decisions, intra-firm trade, and international trade of components and output 
to look at the empirically realistic case where the MNC has four component options: 
manufactures some components itself; is able to import from its own subsidiaries; and can 
also outsource some components to outside suppliers at home, and overseas. In this context, 
trade liberalization can affect both country and organization choices of the firm’s 
component sourcing. This model is partial equilibrium so as to focus on firm-level 
decisions. Hence, non-firm factor prices are assumed exogenously given, and there is no 
tendency towards international FPE. For simplicity, the model assumes away scale 
economies and ignores game-theoretic complexities. We abstract from, or do not explicitly 
focus on, many other issues in the TCE and PRT literature, such as imperfect information, 
contractual incompleteness and hold-up problems.  
 
Our model has some important similarities to the continuous tasks model of Grossman and 
Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and the continuous components model of Feenstra and Hanson 
(1996b). In their models firms are constrained to obtain inputs from outside suppliers, and 
there is no FDI by the firms. In contrast, our model allows a multinational to have a more 
complex set of production and investment decisions. Moreover, our research also relates to 
Feenstra and Hanson (2005) in the sense that the set of outsourcing components are 
endogenous. In Feenstra and Hanson (2005), producing a final good involves two tasks 
(input procurement and assembly) that have to be conducted in China. In contrast, we 
assume that producing a final good requires multiple components that can be made or 
bought in different countries.  
 
The model is used to gain insights into two major issues. The first one is the relationship 
between different modes of component outsourcing and input characteristics: Which 
components will be internally produced and where, which ones will be outsourced, and 
from which country?  Secondly, how does trade liberalization in intermediate inputs and/or 
  4final goods impact on the component sourcing decisions, production and trade patterns of 
the MNC?  We draw on the insights of this model and, then, quantitatively explore a 
previously unused data set on the component trade of Toyota in Southeast Asia, a region 
which has undergone substantial trade liberalization in recent years as part of the 
preferential trading bloc, ASEAN. 
 
An outline of the rest of the paper is as followed. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. 
Section 3 is empirical investigation, and Section 4 is the conclusions. 
 
II Theoretical Model 
 
We build a partial equilibrium model of the firm’s outsourcing and offshoring decisions.  
The model is built based on some basic features of the standard Hecksher-Ohlin. We model  
a multinational firm operating in two countries (‘North’ and ‘South’) which differ in 
relative factor endowments that generates factor price differences.
6 The multinational is a 
monopoly producer of a final good that is internationally tradable, unless its trade costs are 
prohibitive. We assume that the firm produces a final good using firm-specific asset – 
‘headquarter capital’– and a continuum of tradable components (intermediate goods) that 
differ in factor intensities. 
 
We assume that, in the short-run, the MNC has fixed endowments of headquarter capital in 
each country. Headquarter capital is essential for final goods production but can also be 
used for components (in combination with labour). It is non-tradable across firm 
boundaries; hence it has no market value outside the firm. Profit maximization requires the 
full employment of headquarter capital. Thus, the firm-specific capital has an opportunity 
cost – a shadow cost– in each of its competing uses within the firm reflecting the foregone 
opportunity of using it in its alternative use. This varies depending on different allocations 
of headquarter capital. 
 
The MNC faces decision problems regarding component sourcing. In principle, 
components can be obtained in four ways: internal production within the firm, importing 
                                                 
6 The North is a relatively capital-rich country, while the South is relatively labour-rich. Wages are higher in 
the North, i.e. (  ). 
* ww >
  5components from the foreign subsidiary, purchasing from a domestic outside supplier, and 
importing from a foreign outside supplier.  
 
These sourcing options are indifferent in terms of technology; however they are different in 
terms of embedded transaction costs. Transaction costs are assumed to increase with the 
external factor intensity of production.
7 Accordingly, a component   outsourced in a given 
country is subject to higher transaction costs than such a component produced by the firm’s 
subsidiary in that country.  The cross-country trade costs add to the transaction cost 
differences across input options for the offshoring activities. 
i
 
The interested issue here is the component sharing between the firm and outside suppliers. 
Therefore, we assume the parameter values that the firm is not optimal to produce output 
for domestic market only, to produce all components, or to outsource all components. In 
addition, we assume the parameter values that allow international sourcing, both intra-firm 





  The MNC faces downward sloping demands for its final output in each country.   
Assuming a quasi-linear utility function, the North consumers’ demand for the MNC’s final 
good is given by: 




⎛ =− + ⎜
⎝⎠
⎞
⎟ , (1) 
where   is the domestic output for domestic consumption, , and  d C M is the amount of 
imported output. The imported good incurs an ad valorem trade cost (t), which is modeled 
as an iceberg cost: .
9  1 Tt ≡+ A is a market parameter which capture the market size, and 
B is a slope parameter related to the demand elasticity. 
 
                                                 
7 These transaction cost features are consistent with the insights of transaction cost economics which have 
evolved from Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975, 1985). They assume that the firm faces higher transaction 
costs in outsourcing than  in in-house production because of the risk of hold-up problems. 
8 We specify the equations for the MNC’s optimization in the North and note that the same equations hold for 
its optimization in South, where a superscript * denotes a foreign variable, unless stated otherwise.  
9 These trade costs reflect costs involved in international exchange, such as transport costs and tariffs. We 
model these costs as using real resources of the firm. Note that we do not take into account the  income effects 
of tariffs because this is a partial firm-equilibrium model.  
  6 The production function of the MNC’s output takes the Leontief form: 
     









,   (2) 
where  Q H  and  i Z  are the amounts of headquarter capital and component i employed by 
the firm to produce output, Q, in the North. Each unit of the final good uses fixed   units 





Production of each intermediate input requires capital and labour in the Cobb-Douglas 
manner. The MNC can produce input   in any country by using headquarter capital and 
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−− − Θ≡ −  is a constant, and  0< i α <1.  
 
Outside the firm, there are component suppliers who produce and sell intermediate goods in 
perfectly competitive component markets. Suppliers produce components by using 
‘normal’ capital and labour with the same technology. Firms are price takers in these 
capital and labour markets. 
  . (4) 
1 ii
is i i zK L
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i α α λ
− =  ,    (5) 
1 i
is cr w
i α α − =  ,         (6)   
where λ  is the shadow cost of headquarter capital. 
 
Capital intensity of component i is increasing with its capital cost sharing parameter,  i α . 
For convenience, a component spectrum is arranged such that the component index 
represents the relative capital intensity of components. That is, capital intensity is 
increasing with the index:() 0 i i ∂∂ α >  .  To simplify the algebra, we define  i i α ≡ .   
 . 
  74) Bringing component goods or factors, including labour, from outside into the firm 
boundaries is subject to transaction costs. Cross-firm transactions are subject to an ad 
valorem transaction cost  , and imported goods are subject to an ad valorem trade cost  at 
. To simplify the notation, we denote trade and transaction costs in an iceberg form: 
 , where  
F t
C t
1 j T =+ j t ( ) , j CF ∈ . In addition, we do not interest in cross-country differences 
in transaction and trade costs.  
 
Transaction costs depend positively on utilization of external factors in component 
production. Each outsourced component is totally external factor-intensive. Thus, the 
transaction cost of outsourcing component is  . In contrast, the transaction cost of an in-
house component is an increasing function of the labour intensity, i.e. 
F T
( ) 1 Fi i Tfα =− , 
where  . Here, a specific functional form of cross-firm transaction costs is applied: 
an in-house production of component i is subject to ad valorem transaction costs at   
1 0
i f α − ′ >
1 i
Fi F TT
α − ≡ .
 10  
11  
 
 For offshore sourcing, tariffs are applied on top of the FOB component value. An imported 
outsourcing component from the South to the North incurs the total trade and transaction 
costs of  , meanwhile these costs of an intra-firm imported 
component i are 












≡= + + . 
 
                                                 
10 This functional form makes the model isomorphic between assuming that in-house capital is more 
productive than external capital, and assuming that equally productive intermediate inputs are traded across 
firm boundaries with additional transaction costs. For example, suppose that there is no transaction cost but a 
unit of headquarter capital is b (>1) units more productive than a unit of external capital. The production 










⎡ ⎤ ⎛⎞ =Θ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
. The unit cost would be 
()
1 i i
is cb r w
α α − = . We can always choose the unit of b such that  F bT = , which will give the same result as 
that obtained in the later sections.  
11 In addition, it makes the model isomorphic to a model having transaction costs in hiring capital but no 
transaction costs in hiring labour. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) make a related assumption that the 
transaction cost of offshoring components increases with the component index. 
  8Thus, sourcing a component i from different alternatives involves different transaction 
costs. Onshore internal sourcing is subject to the lowest transaction cost, while offshore 
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The demand equal supply condition of componenti gives the input sufficiency condition as 
follows: 
   11 ii
iv is iv is
i




αα −− =+ + +
T
 ,    (7)   
i Z  is the amount of component i required for output production.  The MNC has four 
sourcing options for a component i.   is onshore internal sourcing (vertical integration),  
is onshore outsourcing,   is intra-firm import, and   is the outsourcing import of 
component i. Trade and transaction costs are presented in an ice-berg form. 
iv z
is z iv m is m
 
Endowment Constraints of the Firm 
The MNC has initially allocated headquarter capital for its production in the North at a 
given amount (H ). The firm allocates the headquarter capital between producing final 
goods and intermediate products. We assume that the headquarter capital stock cannot be 
moved across countries, at least in the short-run. Thus, the endowment constraint is given 





HH H d i
=
≥+ ∫ ,   ( i i α = ),  
where  Q H  and   are the headquarter capital amounts used by the MNC to produce output 





We solve for the firm equilibrium by maximizing the MNC’s total profit. The firm seeks an 
optimal allocation of headquarter capital in each country. This means that the MNC 
chooses optimal production of final goods and intermediate products. It also seeks an 
optimal combination of input sourcing.  The MNC’s optimization yields the full 







=+ ∫ i i  (8) 
This also suggests that the firm’s optimization leads to a maximized shadow value of 
headquarter capital.  
 
The Leontief technology of output production in equation (2) yields  demands for 
headquarter capital and a component i: 
  Q H aQ = ,     (9) 
and   iz Z aQ =   .    (10) 
 
The Cobb-Douglas technology of component production yields derived demands for 






























Equilibrium output production requires demand equals supply of the final good. Thus, the 
total output produced in the North equals to domestic consumption plus output export: 
*
d QC M =+.       (12) 
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Using   (10) and (12) in  (7): 
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F T
      (7a) 
 
The MNC can produce output domestically or intra-firm import from overseas. Profit 
maximization with respect to domestic production ( ) and intra-firm import ( d C M ) gives 
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimal domestic production and output import .  i µ  and 
*
i µ  denote the shadow costs of component   employed in the output produced in  the North  i
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+ ∫ , the cost of output production plus the cost of intermediate inputs, while the 
unit cost of an intra-firm imported final-good is given by  .  The 
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 Optimal output requires marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Using the Kuhn-Tucker 
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For each component, the MNC has options to produce the component in the North, produce 
in the South, outsource to an outside firm in the North, and outsource to an outside firm in 
the South. Profit maximization with respect to input choices gives the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions for optimal mode of input sourcing: 
iv z >0 if  ( ) { }
1 11 ** min  , , ,
i
i i
i F iv C F is F is C F iv F iv Tc T T c T c T T c Tc
α αα µ
− −− == , else  =0.    iv z (15a) 
iv m >0 if i µ = ( ) ( ) { }
11 1 ** * min  , , ,
i i
i
C F iv C F is F is C F iv F iv TT c T T cT cTT cT c
αα α −− − = ,else  =0.   iv m (15b) 
is z >0  if   i µ = ( ) { }
1 1 ** min  , , ,
i
i
F is C F is F is C F iv F iv Tc TTc Tc T T c T c
α α − − = , else  =0.   is z (15c) 
is m >0 if   i µ = ( ) { }
1 1 ** * min  , , ,
i
i
CFi s CFi s Fi s C F i v F i v TTc TTc Tc T T c T c
α α − − = , else  =0,     is m (15d) 
These conditions suggest that the optimal mode of sourcing a component i gives the 
minimal unit-cost of the component: 
      () { }
1 1 ** min  , , ,
i
i
i C F is F is C F iv F iv TTc Tc T T c T c
α α µ
− − = ,       (16) 
  11where  ()( )















i α α λ
− ≡  are, 
respectively, unit production costs of component   sourced from an outside firm in the 
South, from an outside firm in the North, from its own firm in the South, and its own firm 
in the North.  
i
 
These Kuhn-Tucker conditions give the critical values of headquarter capital. The MNC 
would not source any component inside if the shadow value of its capital is higher than the 
‘adjusted’ cost of external capital. Conditions (15a) and (15c) imply that the firm will 
source a component i inside ( >0) if  iv z F Tr λ ≤ . Conditions (15b) and (15d) imply that the 
firm will intra-firm import the component ( >0) if  .    iv m
**
F Tr λ ≤
 
These equations will form the basis for analyzing the effects of trade liberalization on the 




We begin the analysis by determining the equilibrium outsourcing and offshoring of the 
firm in autarky, and then compare this to the equilibrium outcome when we allow trade in 
components and, then, in output at intermediate levels of trade costs. Finally, we conduct 
comparative static analysis to investigate implications of the model on the impacts of 
lowering trade costs on the firm boundary, intra-firm trade and international trade. 
 
a) Specialization Pattern in the Closed Economy 
 
In autarky, high trade barriers do not allow importing components or outputs (i.e. 
). Thus, the firm produces output just for domestic consumption, i.e. condition 
(13a) is applicable:
12  
, C TT →∞
d CQ = ,     0 M = .  (17) 
The input sourcing choices of the firm in autarky are domestic outsourcing and domestic 
production, i.e. the relevant input sourcing conditions are (15a) and (15c). The firm would 
                                                 
12 We only consider the MNC’s optimization in the  North subsidiary here, because similar arguments apply 
to the South. 
  12not produce any component unless  F Tr λ ≤  in the initial equilibrium. The firm can 
increases its profits by producing more components inside the firm up until the shadow cost 
of headquarter capital rises to F Tr λ = . In other words, the firm has an incentive to produce 
a component only if headquarter capital is cheaper than external capital (adjusted by a 
transaction cost). Hence, as long as the firm has incentives to produce a component, the 
marginal profit is higher for producing a relatively capital intensive component. In addition, 
the assumption that the firm faces higher transaction costs in producing components with 
higher external factor intensities means that the firm has a preference towards producing 
the more capital-intensive components. The firm can move progressively towards the 
optimal point using factor content-based ordering, moving from more capital-intensive 
components to less capital-intensive components until it reaches the equilibrium  F Tr λ =  at 
the marginal component of the autarky equilibrium is denoted by  A i α = .
13  
 
The input sufficiency condition (7a) and the optimal output condition (17) give: 
  () : 1 , A i α ∈   ( ) Q a T z z F iv
i α − =
1  ( 0 = is z , 0 = iv m  and   ). (18a)  0 = is m
  () : , 0 A i α ∈   ( ) Q a T z z F is
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1 ,   ( 0 = iv z , 0 = iv m  and   ). (18b)    0 = is m
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Substituting  F Tr λ = ,  ,  d CQ = ( ) Q a T z z F iv
i α − =
1  and  0 = iv m  in the full employment 
condition of headquarter capital (8a) gives the equilibrium condition that determines the 
















                                                
    (20) 
 
13 In principle, when there are an infinite variety of different components, multiple equilibria may exist 
because the firm may be able to choose more than one combination of quantities and varieties for internal 
production such that the  F Tr λ = condition is satisfied. But when the number of components is finite, as is 
the real world case, the optimal condition will be satisfied in general as an inequality, and the equilibrium will 
be, in general, unique. (With finite components, the equilibrium shadow cost in general will be infinitesimally 
below  .)  One might also imagine that a plausible rule of thumb for the firm’s managers would be to keep 
the most capital-intensive activities inside the firm.  
F Tr
  13b) Specialization Patterns in Trading Equilibrium 
 
Reducing trade costs from autarky to an intermediate level can lead to international trade of 
components and output. We begin the analysis by the firm equilibrium when allowing trade 
in components, and, then allowing both trade in components and output. 
 
b.1) Intermediate Trade Costs in Components, High Trade Costs in Output 
 
When trade in components is possible, offshore sourcing may be  optimal. Component 
sharing between the two countries means some components are cheaper to source from the 
North, while other are cheaper to source from the South, and there is the marginal 
component where the costs are indifferent. The marginal component is denoted by i=  2 α , 
() ( ) ()
22 2 2
1 1 **
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In the South, the marginal component i=
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Component sharing means  ( )
*
22 ,0 , αα∈ 1 . This require that Factor-price differences are 





>1, outsourcing from the North is relatively cheaper 
than outsourcing from the South for the components that are more capital-intensive than the 
marginal components.  
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  14In-house component sharing between the two countries follows the similar pattern. The 
MNC produces some components in the North when  F Tr λ ≤ , while it produces some 
components in the South when  .  The factor-prices differences suggest that in-
house sourcing in the North would be more capital-intensive components than intra-firm 
sourcing from the South. Meanwhile, 
*
F Tr λ ≤
*
F Tr λ ≤  suggests that in-house production of the 
North ( ) is more capital-intensive than domestic outsourcing  ( ), while   
suggests that the intra-firm imports from the South ( )  are more capital-intensive than 
the  imports from outside suppliers ( ).  
iv z is z
**




Therefore, if it is profitable for the MNC to produce some components in the North and 
South subsidiaries, and buy some components from suppliers in the North and South 
countries, then the most capital-intensive range of components are sourced inside the firm 
in the North, followed by outsourcing in the North, in-house production in the South, and 
finally, outsourcing in the South (Figure 1). 
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The optimal output is given by: 
i = 0 
        (L-intensive) 
  = 1  i
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Note that offshore sourcing reduces marginal cost of output production from the marginal 
cost in autarky. Therefore, the firm produces more output in this trading equilibrium than in 
autarky.  
 
b.2) Intermediate Trade Costs in Components and Output   
 
Reducing output tariffs allow the MNC to export output from the country that has cost 
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At  F rT λ =  and  ,   < 
**
F rT λ = q c ( )
*
q Tc . The equilibrium condition (13a) suggests  0 M = . 
Hence, The MNC will not import output from the South to the North. In other word, the 
MNC will not export output from the South to the North. In contrast, the MNC may export 
output from the North to South if conditions (13b or 13c) is satisfied, i.e.    if 
 . In other words, the necessary condition for the existence of a North output 
export is: 
* 0 M >
* () q Tc c ≤ q















⎝⎠ ∫∫ µ ⎟       ( 2 8 )  
The firm does not export components from the South suggests that the firm produce output 
and components there. Thus,   , and 
**
F rT λ =














⎝⎠ ∫∫ µ ⎟ .      ( 2 9 )  
Note that the likelihood of international trade in output decreases with an output tariff, 
while increases with capital-cost differences.   F rT λ =  in the initial equilibrium. Hence, the 
  16MNC would export output from the North if an output tariff is sufficiently low relative to 
the differences in capital costs.   
 
Assume that outputs are produced in both countries, condition (29) is binding at strict 
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, where    (30) 
**
F rT λ =




d = .  
 
Output export increases the shadow cost of headquarter capital (λ ) of the export producer 
from the initial equilibrium level (λ > ). In other word, output export increases demands 
for headquarter capital, and the MNC has to outsource components that were produced 
inside the firm in the North to other firms in that country (Figure 2).  
F rT
Figure (2) Patterns of Component Sourcing Options:  
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Output production in the North increases from the initial equilibrium, and it is given by 
equation (8a) and   = 0:      
*
iv iv zm +
*
d QC M =+=
H
a
.        ( 3 1 )  
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⎝⎠ ∫ ⎟ ,    (33) 
In contrast, output production in the South decreases from the previous equilibrium by the 

















=− + − ⎜
⎝⎠ ∫ ⎟ .   (34) 
Substituting   and  from equations (31) and (34) in the full employment of headquarter 
capital in the South (equation 24) decreases 
Q
* Q
1 α  index from the previous equilibrium level 
(Figure 2). Output reduction in the South releases some of the headquarter capital. 
Therefore, the MNC  uses the released capital to produce more components in the South 
and reduces outsourcing.  
 
Comparative Static Analysis 
 
In this section, we draw implications of the model on the impacts of trade liberalization on 
the firm boundary, intra-firm trade and international trade. To show the different impacts 
between trade liberalization in components and in final goods, we assume that the North 
and South progressively liberalize their trade, starting with autarky to free trade in 
components and, then, free trade in output.  
 
We conduct comparative static analysis based on the assumption that factor-price 
differences create trade incentives at an intermediate level of trade costs. However, the two 
countries are similar in other parameter values, including demand conditions, transaction 
and trade costs, and headquarter capital endowments. This also implies that tariff 
reductions are common between the two countries. 
 
The results of tariff reductions on the MNC’s production and outsourcing patterns in the 
North and South are graphed in Figure (3) and (4), respectively.
16 The left part of each 
figure shows the allocation of headquarter capital between output production for domestic 
                                                 
16 The parameter values in the simulation, unless otherwise specified are as follows:  , 
, 
* 200 AA ==
* 1.5 BB ==
* 100 HH ==,   1.1 F T = ,  1 a = ,  1 z a = ,  
* 1 w = , 
* 10 r = ,   ,  .  2 w = 5 r =
  18market, for export, and component productions. The right parts illustrate the firm 
boundaries along the extensive margin of components. We compare the changes the firm’s 
resource allocation and boundaries from autarky to free trade.  
 
The three parts along a vertical axis show the impacts of progressive trade liberalization, 
starting with autarky at the upper part, trade liberalization in components at the middle part 
and, then, trade liberalization in output at the lower part. In autarky. the MNC sources all 
components domestically: Relatively capital-intensive components are source inside the 
firm, while relatively  labour-intensive are outsourcing. This continues to be the case up 
until component tariffs are higher than 100 per cent ( ). Meanwhile, the firm 
produces output for domestic market, not for export, if output tariffs are greater than 68 per 
cent, ( ). 
2 C T >
1.68 T >
Figure (3) Production and Outsourcing Patterns in the North  
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Figure (4) Production and Outsourcing Patterns in the South 
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As trade costs continue to fall, there are incentives to offshore sourcing. The interested 
range of parameter values is that allow component sharing between countries and firms. 
The MNC produces different components in each country and trades these components 
intra-firm. The firm also outsources components from both domestic and foreign suppliers. 
Therefore, the firm boundaries are determined by equations (21, 22, 23, and 24).  
  19 
As input tariffs fall from 30 to 0 per cent, an output tariff of greater than 65 per cent 
prohibits trade in the final good. A reduction of input tariff has direct and indirect impacts 
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). We illustrate direct and indirect effects by  
line and dash arrows, respectively. Then, the net effect is the total of those two effects. 
  The direct impacts of tariff reductions are ambiguous. A North tariff reduction may 
decreases the range of in-house sourcing components (Figure 3), while a South tariff 
reduction may expand the firm boundary along the extensive margin (Figure 4). A falling 
North tariffs encourage the firm to import more components from the South to the North, 
i.e. the marginal component of intra-firm imports ( 2 α ) tends to shift toward a relatively 
more capital-intensive component. Therefore, the demand fore headquarter capital 
increases, and this forces the firm to increase outsourcing (shifting  1 α  rightward). Note that 
outsourcing increases by more than intra-firm sourcing in order to achieve the required 
higher capital intensity of intra-firm import ( 12 α α ∆ >∆ ). In contrast, a South tariff 
reduction encourage the MNC to import more components from the North to the South, i.e. 
the marginal component of intra-firm imports (
*
2 α ) tends to shift toward a relatively more 
labour-intensive component. Thus, some headquarter capital is released. Ignoring indirect 
effects, the firm uses the released capital to produce more components in the South.  
 
For the indirect impacts, a tariff reduction in any country may decrease the range of in-
house sourcing along the extensive margin in order to trade off for the increasing volume of 
output. However, the indirect tariff effect is positive and decreasing in   and  . Thus, 




In principle, the tariff effect is ambiguous. The net effect of liberalization of trade in 
components depends on factors such as relative market sizes in the two countries and how 
responsive final good demands are to tariff changes. If there is a tariff reduction, it is likely 
  20that an MNC may expand its firm boundary if its South market is large, or the demands for 
final good in the South are highly elastic. In contrast, if the North is a large market or 
highly elastic demand, the effect of the North tariff reduction might dominate.  
 
However, if we observe particular trends in component trade following input-trade 
liberalisation, we can draw some conclusions about what may be happening to the nature of 
in-house component production within the MNC subsidiaries. For example, if we observe 
that higher imports by the North may indicate shrinking of the firm boundary, while higher 
imports by the South may suggest that the firm boundary is expanding.  
 
We now turn to the effects of output liberalization. Given that component trade is freed, 
trade in output begins as an output tariff falls to 63 per cent. The MNC produces output in 
the North and components in the South, and then intra-firm export them to each other 
country. The firm still produces output in the South given that the stock of headquarter 
capital in the North is relatively small compared to the jointed output market. As an output 
tariff falls from 65 to 0 per cent, output export expands and so does the range of in-house 
sourcing. Hence, liberalization of trade in output tends to enhance international production 
network and expand in-house sourcing along the extensive margin.  
 
III Empirical Investigation 
 
We have been fortunate in being able to access a unique data set on component imports by 
Toyota subsidiaries in ASEAN countries; this data set includes both their imports from 
Toyota Thailand, and also from outside (non-Toyota) suppliers in Thailand.  The period 
covered by the data set - 1999 to 2003 – was one during which substantial changes took 
place in the trade barriers affecting car component trade within ASEAN. Under the AICO 
program, significant progress was made on intra-regional trade liberalization in car 
components, but not on trade in finished cars. Thus, the model implications on trade 
liberalization in components from the previous section may be applicable to the AICO trade 
liberalization of auto components in ASEAN.  
 
In the circumstances, we have attempted to exploit the data set as much as possible by 
specifying an empirically implementable econometric model that is informed by the key 
insights of the theoretical model. The empirical model presented below should not be 
  21interpreted as derived strictly from the theoretical model, because even this unique and 
quite rich data set does not permit us to test our model directly. Nevertheless, we would 
argue that it is based on conceptualizations about relationships that are empirically 
plausible and consistent with the core features of the theoretical model.     
 
We use the data set to investigate the following issues. First, we investigate the factors that 
influence which components will be imported from Toyota’s affiliates, and which ones will 
be imported from outside firms. We assume that components with high value or high 
engineering complexity can be rated as capital-intensive components. In the context of our 
model, such components are taken to be intensive in their use of headquarter capital. Under 
this interpretation, the theoretical model in chapter 3 would suggest that intra-firm imports 
from Toyota Thailand by Toyota subsidiaries in other ASEAN-4 countries (i.e. intra-firm 
imports) would tend to be of higher value or higher engineering complexity than 
components imported from unaffiliated firms (i.e. outsourced) in Thailand.  
 
Second, we investigate the relationship between intra-firm sourcing of components and 
their link to various car models. We conceptualize that transaction costs are positively 
correlated with the ‘quality factor’, because components used in the higher quality car 
models would tend to be of higher quality requiring a higher level of quality control, 
monitoring, and so on.
17 Therefore, we assume that transactions costs incurred for 
components to be used in higher quality cars will tend to be higher. In this case, the 
theoretical model would suggest that components used in higher quality cars are more 
likely to be sourced within the firm. 
 
Third, we investigate how trade liberalization affects the Toyota ASEAN subsidiaries’ 
decisions to choose between sourcing components from Toyota Thailand and sourcing from 
non-Toyota suppliers in Thailand. To the extent that Thailand can be considered a ‘North’ 
country with respect to other ASEAN countries, the model prediction would be that intra-




                                                 
17 Williamson (1985) and Dyer (1997) consider quality controls as a firm activity that gives rise to transaction 
costs. 
18 We observe rapidly increases of component imports by Toyota ASEAN from Thailand. 
19 Thailand and Malaysia are higher wage countries relative to Indonesia and the Philippines. Because some 
imports are from subsidiaries in Malaysia, the actual trade pattern may not strictly conform to the implication 
drawn here. 
  22We track Toyota’s applications for AICO arrangements submitted to Thailand’s Ministry of 
Industry. The applications show the planned component imports of Toyota subsidiaries in 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines from Toyota Thailand and also from outside 
suppliers in Thailand.
20 The component trade requires approval from the government of 
trading partner countries in order to get AICO tariff preferences. The AICO applications  
cover 900 types of components used in three different models of Toyota passenger cars. 
These components are produced in Thailand by 97 component suppliers; which some of 
these are Toyota affiliates and some are not. The components are imported by Toyota 
subsidiaries in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines as intermediate inputs.
21  
 
These component imports of Toyota’s subsidiaries provide 1,923 observations in the data 
set. Each observation is a component specified by the component’s sourcing mode. There 
are three component’s sourcing modes, which differ by the degree of sourcing inside the 
firm: First, components produced by Toyota’s affiliates are defined as ‘vertically 
integrated’ components. Second, components produced by the affiliates of Toyota’s 
keiretsu suppliers are defined as ‘semi-integrated’ or, in other words, ‘keiretsu outsourced. 
Finally, components produced by independent suppliers are defined as ‘independent 
outsourced’. We rate these component sourcing forms according to the degree of vertical 
integration. Specifically, we assign a highest score (2) to sourcing from Toyota’s affiliates, 
while we assign a lowest score (0) to independent outsourcing. 
 
We investigate what are factors explain these component sourcing decisions of Toyota. The 
choice of organizational form is our dependent variable. The underlying specification is 
   iii y i δ ε = ++ x β ,  
where   is the rating of vertical integration in a component i as specified above,   is a 
vector of sourcing determinants, 
i y i x
i δ is a parameter, and  i ε  is a normally distributed error 
term. We estimate the probability of the organizational choice by ordered PROBIT such 
that  ( Pr i yv = x ) i , where  () outsourcing 0 v = ,  ( ) keiretsu 1 v = , and  () integration 2 v = . 
                                                 
20 Our data opportunity has been created due to the strict administrative procedures of the AICO program. 
Each product traded under the AICO program has to be approved by the governments of the exporting and 
importing countries. AICO tariff preferences are exclusive and applicable only to approved products with 
approved product uses, approved traded volume, approved participating companies, and approved trade 
destination. A final-good producer that would like to participate in the AICO program has to apply by 
submitting required information about traded products to the governments of participating countries.  
21 There was no trade in the final outputs during the data period. 
  23Therefore, the positive coefficients of the explanatory variables will imply the increased 
likelihood of sourcing inside the firm. In other words, it implies the decreased probability 
of outsourcing.   includes key component characteristics, such as component’s producer 
price, tariff preferences, index of car model which the component will be used. These 
variables are also observed from the AICO data set. In addition, we add other independent 
variables, including engineering complexity rating and Thailand’s ‘local content 
requirement (LCR)’ point, to the data set. We now turn to discuss the explanatory variables 
in more details. 
i x
 
Index of Car Models 
The index of car models represents a range in quality of final products. Components in the 
data set are the auto-parts for the three ranges of Toyota sedans assembled in Southeast 
Asian countries: the Camry (high-range), the Corolla (mid-range), and the Soluna-Vios 
(low-range). Camry is produced for relatively upper market, Soluna-Vios is for relatively 
lower market, and Corolla lies in between. The market price of a Camry is the highest 
(approximately US$30,000-35,000 in the Thai market), Soluna-Vios is the lowest priced 
model (about US$12,000-15,000) and Corolla price lies in between the others (about 
US$20,000-22,000). Hence, a discrete numerical value from zero to two is assigned to 
these car models, such that the highest value of the index represent components of the high-
range model while the lowest value represents components of the low-range model. 
 
Component Price 
Toyota reports producer prices of components in US dollar terms. Therefore, the same price 
is applied to a specific component of a specific car model regardless of export destinations. 
We did not adjust for inflation. We felt that there was no reasonably practical procedure 
that could be adopted to properly adjust all the relevant prices during this period when the 
ASEAN-4 countries floated their currencies and there were huge differences of inflation 
rates across countries.  
 
Engineering Complexity Rating (ECR) 
Data on engineering complexity rating (ECR) are obtained from Head et al. (2004). We 
classify components into groups by end-use functions according to the classification of 
Thailand’s Ministry of Industry. We then code the ECR index from Head et al. (2004) to 
  24matching component groups in order to represent the group-specific technical 
characteristics of components. The rating ranges from 1 to 10 according to the engineering 
complexities rated from low to high.
22  However, there are limited matching data, and thus 
only some groups of components can be coded with the ECR. 
 
Tariff Barriers 
The AICO program offers exemption from the MFN tariff to intra-ASEAN trade of 
approved products. Thus, AICO tariff reductions on specific components are equal to the 
prevailing MFN tariffs.  MFN tariffs on car components from ASEAN countries are 
discrete from 0-30 per cent. 
 
Local Content Requirement (LCR) points 
LCR points are another indicator of substantial changes that took place during 1999-2003 
in the trade barriers affecting the car component trade of Thailand and other ASEAN-4 
countries, which all had quite similar LCR policy barriers.
23 Car producers would get LCR 
points from components sourced domestically and were obliged to meet the minimum 
requirement for accumulated LCR points. We conceptualize that LCR points are positively 
related to component trade barriers, because a car producer would have a higher incentive 
to domestically source components in a group with a relatively high LCR point. 
Components imported under the AICO program would receive Local Content accreditation 
and other incentives given to locally-produced components by the importing countries’ 
governments.
24 Therefore, we use LCR points as an alternative measure of tariff 
                                                 
22 Head et al. (2004) apply the information provided in Monterverde and Teece (1982)  to obtain the ECR 
rating. They use the ECR as an indirect measurement of the technical specificity of products in order to find 
support for the TCE approach. 
23 Under the Local Content Requirement (LCR) program, each component group classified by end-uses was 
rated by the Thai government according to, in principle, the extent of its input into a car’s value and, in 
practice, the government’s priority in promoting domestic production of targeted industries (from interviews 
with the Office of Industrial Economics, Thailand’s Ministry of Industry).    In principle, the LCR points were 
supposed to reflect their cost shares of components in a car’s value. However, we find that LCR points are 
more correlated with engineering characteristics than component costs. The correlation between engineering 
complexity rating and LCR points is 79 per cent, while the correlation between component price and LCR 
points is minus 4 per cent. This likely means that the government gave relatively high LCR points to targeted 
auto parts regardless of their cost shares in a car’s value, and the targeted auto-part industries tended to be  
relatively engineering-complex. For details about LCR, see e.g. Abdulsomand (2003), Bunjongcheep (1995), 
Wattnasiritham (2000) and Chanaratcharak (2004). 
24 The LCR policy is removed by 2003 as a part of ongoing trade liberalization. 




Some limitations of the data should be noted. First, the data set does not cover components 
sourced from non-ASEAN countries, mainly from Japan which accounts for 40-70 per cent 
of the auto-part imports of the ASEAN countries in 2003. Second, the data represent 
planned annual trade, not actual trade. The proposals are made at least a year in advance 
before approval is granted, and the actual trade started. Thus, there could be some 
variations between proposed and actual transactions. However, comparable data on actual 
AICO trade were not available to us. Third, the data are available for only four years, from 
1999 to 2003. Since 2003 the AICO program has been integrated into AFTA, and thus there 
have been no comparable data since then. Despite these limitations, the AICO data is a rich 
source of information that provides a valuable opportunity to investigate outsourcing at the 
firm level. Because supplier information is usually confidential, it is almost impossible to 




Table (1) compares data characteristics across the organizational structures of component 
suppliers and with those of the overall data set. Independent outsourcing accounts for over 
a half of the observations. The three forms of input sourcing tend to differ by component 
prices. On average, in-house components are relatively high-value components compared 
to the other groups, while independent outsourcing components are relatively low-value, 
and keiretsu outsourcing lies in between. Mean comparison tests confirm that the price 
differences are statistically significant at the one per cent level.  
 
Components with tariffs at 25-30 per cent dominate the data set. They account for 50.1, 
49.1 and 63.1 per cent of components under independent outsourcing, keiretsu outsourcing 
and vertical integration, respectively. Components with tariffs at 10-15 per cent account for 
38.5, 39.0 and 27.9 per cent of those sourcing forms, respectively. 
 
                                                 
25 Note that the data on tariff preferences are measured by the MFN tariffs of the importing countries 
(Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines), while LCR points are the exporting country’s data (Thailand). 
  26Moreover, the tariff rates seem to be country specific. 97 per cent of components exported 
to the Philippines are waived from the Philippines’ 10 per cent tariff, and 84 per cent of the 
exports to Malaysia are waived from Malaysia’s 25-30 per cent  tariffs. About 52 per cent 
of the Indonesian procurements are waived from the 15 per cent tariff, while the rest 
generally vary from 5, 10 and 25 per cent at the proportions of 17.5, 11 and 14 per cent of 
the observations. 
Table (1) Descriptive Statistics, by Sourcing Options 
 Vertical 
 Integration (V) 






# Obs   312  609  1,002   1,923 
% Obs  16.2  31.7  52.1  100.0 
Component Price(US$)          
                              : Average  13.8  7.7  3.7  6.6 
                              : SD  21.5  10.6  8.1  12.6 
                              : Min   1  1  1  1 
                              : Max  136  89  136  136 
Mean Diff. test : Differences 
                           : (SE) 
Pv - Pk = 6.07
/a 
(1.29) 




 Price per centiles (US$) : 25
th     1  2  1  1 
                                         : 50
th   4  3  1  2 
                                         : 75
th   13  10  3  6 
                                         : 95
th   61  32  13  32 
Sourcing Structures by Models (%) :   
Camry : 100  21.0  34.7  44.3   
Corolla : 100  14.3  29.2  56.5   
Vios : 100  16.5  34.6  48.9   
Sourcing structures by countries (% )       
Indonesia    : 100  19.2  39.3  41.5   
Malaysia     : 100  18.2  30.6  51.2   
Philippines  : 100  10.8  30.7  58.5   
Tariff Structure  (% Obs)         
MFN Tariff Rates (%):  0  1.3  4.3  1.7  2.4 
                                       5  7.4  3.9  2.8  3.9 
                                       7  0.0  1.0  0.1  0.4 
                                      10  18.6  27.8  33.0  29.0 
                                      15  9.3  11.2  5.5  7.9 
                                      20  0.3  2.8  6.8  4.5 
                                      25  41.3  24.3  31.9  31.0 
                                      30  21.8  24.8  18.2  20.9 
Note: 
/a  Significance at less than 1% level. 
Source: Compilation from AICO data. 
 
Econometric Evidence  
 
The main findings are presented in Table (2). The core variables are estimated in column 
(1). The results support key predictions of the theoretical model. The estimated coefficient 
of component price is statistically significant at less than the one per cent level, which 
means component value raises the probability of intra-firm imports. In addition, the quality 
  27of final products and tariff preferences tend to increase the likelihood of intra-firm import. 
The estimated coefficients of car model and tariff preference are statistically significant at 
the five per cent level.  
Table (2)   Outsourcing of Toyota:  
Ordered Probit from the Thai Exported Parts of Camry, Corolla and Vios 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Model  0.103 /b  0.099 /b  0.111 /b  0.094 /b  0.090 /b  0.086 /b 
    (0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) 
Pi  0.027 /a  0.027 /a  0.027/a  0.030 /a  0.030 /a  0.030 /a 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Tariff  Pref.  0.707 /b  0.727 /b  0.708/b       
    (0.318)  (0.316)  (0.325)     
Point        3.174 /a  3.180 /a  3.886 /a 
          (0.322) (0.323) (0.533) 
Avg Point      0.158  0.072    0.160  0.252 /b 
      (0.113)  (0.112)    (0.112)  (0.118) 
ECR            0.086 /a      -0.043 /c 
        (0.014)      (0.022) 
cut1  0.460 0.482 0.965 0.636 0.654 0.464 
    (0.092) (0.092) (0.117) (0.061) (0.062) (0.106) 
cut2  1.451 1.472 1.974 1.667 1.686 1.492 
    (0.097) (0.096) (0.118) (0.068) (0.066) (0.106) 
Obs  1923 1923 1824 1923 1923 1824 
Log Likelihood  -1836.6  -1836.6  -1735.8 -1790.2 -1789.3 -1713.2 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ordinal index of vertical integration (ν =0,1,2). The table reports ordered 
probit estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
  /a significant at 1%, /b significant at 5%, /c significant at 10% level. 
    
Group characteristic variables are added to the specifications in columns (2) and (3). 
Column (2) introduces average LCR points.
26 Using average LCR points rather than 
absolute LCR points means the point variable is deflated by group size.  The coefficient of 
average point is positive but not significant.
27 Column (3) is estimated from a sub-sample 
of  data, including components in the groups rated by engineering complexity in Head et al. 
(2004). It suggests that groups of complex components tend to be more vertically integrated 
than groups of simple components at the one per cent significance level.  
 
Columns (4) to (6) repeat estimations (1) to (3) but change the policy variable from tariff to 
local content points. Similar to the tariff, the LCR points show positive relationships with 
                                                 
26 Avg. LCR Point of group j  = LCR Point of group  j  /  # AICO parts in group  j . 
27 However, we use the number of AICO parts in an individual component group to calculate the average 
points of each group, because there are auto parts sourced outside the AICO program. 
  28the probability of intra-firm import. Components in the groups that received higher LCR 
points have a higher probability of being sourced within the firm boundary than 
components in the groups that had lower LCR points. The estimated coefficient of another 
group-specific engineering index, ECR, becomes less significant and average LCR points 
become moderately significant when introducing LCR points into the estimation as shown 
in column (6). This may be due to a high correlation between engineering characteristics 
and how the points are determined. 
 
Table (3) presents the resulting marginal effects coefficient for the statistically significant 
variables specified in Table (1). The marginal effects reflect the change in the predicted 
probability of   (vertically integrated components) given a change in the variable. The 
probability changes are evaluated at the mean value of the independent variables (and at the 
mid-range model of the car-model variable). The marginal effect suggests that an increased 
tariff preference tends to increase the probability of intra-firm import. The quality level of 
car models increases the probability of intra-firm imported components. Increases in 
component value and the engineering complexity index give rise to the probability of intra-
firm imports. However, no evidence of the ECR effect is found if the LCR points are used 
as the measure of policy. 
2 v =
Table (3) Marginal Effects for Vertical Integration ( )  2 v =
  dy / dx 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model =  1  0.024  /b  0.021 /b  0.027 /b  0.022 /b 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Discrete  Change:      
Model: 0 → 1  0.023 0.020 0.025 0.021 
Model: 1 → 2  0.025 0.022 0.028 0.023 
Pi = mean: 6.9  0.006 /a  0.007 /a  0.007 /a  0.007 /a 
 (0.001)  (0001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Tariff  Pref.= mean: 19  0.00166 /b    0.00166 /b   
 (0.074)    (0.074)   
Point = mean: 1    0.0724 /a    0.0857 /a 
   (0.074)    (0.130) 
ECR  = mean: 6.037      0.021 /a  -0.007 
     (0.003)  (0.005) 
Pr ( 2 vx = )  0.152 0.145 0.155 0.152 
#Obs  1923 1923 1824 1824 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ordinal index of vertical integration (ν =0,1,2). The table reports the 
marginal effect of vertical integration from ordered probit estimation with standard errors in parentheses. 
/a significant at 1%, /b significant at 5%, /c significant at 10% level. 
 
  29Robustness Checks 
 
Endogeneity may be a problem in the estimation of the effects of trade liberalization on the 
firm’s component options. This might occur if tariff levels and LCR points are endogenous 
with respect to the carmaker’s sourcing decisions. For example, Toyota might have lobbied 
for the high LCR points on components made inside the firm in response to the progressive 
local content requirement, or the firm might have lobbied the governments of hosting 
countries for high tariff protection on the firm’s in-house components against imports from 
other firms. If these endogeneity problems exist, they could lead to inconsistent estimates 
of the impacts of trade liberalization on component choices.
  
 
We tested for the existence of endogeneity problems using the instrumental variable (IV) 
approach. We use average LCR points as an instrument of tariff preferences and LCR 
points. (Table 4). Average points satisfy the main requirements for using IV: It does not 
correlate with the error term of the baseline specification as shown in columns (2) and (3) 
of Table (1), and it correlates with tariff preferences and LCR points at the one per cent and 
8 per cent level, respectively.  
Table (4)  
The First-stage OLS Regressions of Tariffs and LCR Points on Average Points  
 Coefficient  P>  t   R
2  Prob > F  Obs. 
Dependent Variable: Tariff           
Avg. Point  -0.287 /a  0.006  0.005  0.0065  1923 
 (0.010)         
Dependent Variable: Point           
Avg. Point  -0.008 /c  0.073  0.0005  0.073  1923 
 (0.005)         
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
  /a significant at 1%, /b significant at 5%, /c significant at 10% level. 
Source: Compilation from AICO data. 
 
The coefficients of the policy variables become negative and statistically insignificant when 
the IV approach is applied (Columns (2) and (5) of Table 5). These results suggest that 
endogeneity problem may be present. However, this may also be due to the quality of the 
instrument variable: average LCR points may not be a very good instrument variable, as the 
first-stage estimation shows that the R-square of the first-stage regressions of tariff and 
LCR points on the instrument variable is low. 
 
  30However, some remarks should be noted about the tariff preference variable. First, the 
variations in tariff variables in the data set come from country differences in auto-part tariff 
levels, but tariff levels do not vary across products. For example, the Philippines’ tariffs on 
most auto-parts in the data set are ten per cent, while Malaysian imports in the data set are 
largely subject to tariffs at 25-30 per cent. Second, if the endogeneity issue is the case, it 
likely means that the tariff level is intensified in order to protect in-house components of 
the firm in hosting countries against imports. Thus, tariff reduction would lead to an 
increase in the outsourcing of imports. If this was the case, we would see negative tariff 
coefficients in the original regressions. However, the original tariff coefficient does not 
show a negative sign.  
Table (5)  2SLS Estimates of Instrument Variables  
  (1) (2) (4) (5) 
   2SLS    2SLS 
Model  0.103 /b  0.071 /c  0.094 /b  0.071 /c 
   (0.042)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
Pi  0.027 /a  0.027 /a  0.030 /a  0.027 /a 
   (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.001) 
Tariff  Pref.  0.707 /b       
    (0.318)     
Tariff Pref.  (IV)    -5.066     
   (0.199)     
Point     3.174  /a  
       (0.322)   
Point (IV)        -17.258 
       (13.431) 
cut1 0.460  -0.680  0.636  -1.419 
   (0.092)  (0.764)  (0.061)  (1.407) 
cut2 1.451  3.08  1.667  -0.431 
   (0.097)  (0.765)  (0.068)  (1.406) 
Obs  1923 1923 1923 1923 
Log  Likelihood  -1836.6 -1838.3 -1790.2 -1838.3 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ordinal index of vertical integration (ν =0,1,2). The table reports ordered 
probit estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
  2SLS Estimation is performed by using average LCR points as an instrument of tariff preferences 
and LCR points. 
  /a significant at 1%, /b significant at 5%, /c significant at 10% level. 
 
IV  Conclusions 
 
This paper offers insights as to why an MNC chooses to source particular types of 
components inside the firm boundary, while outsourcing other components to outside firms. 
  31We develop a model of endogenous outsourcing decisions which in corporates key aspects 
of an MNC operating in a world of falling trade costs. The partial-equilibrium model allows 
for international intra-firm trade in components, outsourcing across country boundaries, as 
well as trade in output. Our approach provides a factor content-based ordering of the 
components sourced from the various options. The component sorting pattern within the 
production network is somewhat similar to complete specialization in the trade literature. 
That is, the factor intensity of component production determines intra-product 
specialization across countries. In addition, the intensity of the firm-specific asset 
determines the means of component sourcing in each country. 
 
A general prediction is that internal sourcing within the firm in each country tends to be 
relatively more capital-intensive than outsourcing within the same country. Our model 
provides a factor intensity ordering of the components sourced from the various options. If 
the MNC sources components from both within and outside the firm, and in both countries, 
the most capital-intensive components of the range tend to be produced internally in the 
North, the intermediate capital-intensive components tend to be outsourced to the North 
suppliers, the intermediate labour-intensive components tend to be produced internally in 
the South, and the most labour-intensive components of the range will be outsourced to the 
South suppliers. In addition, if international trade in output takes place, the MNC will 
export output from the North, and, then, reduces its component production there. The firm 
may no longer produce a component in the North if the market sizes are large relative to the 
firm’s capital endowment there. 
 
In addition, the model enables us to analyze the effects of trade liberalization on the firm 
boundary, where international trade takes place in components and in final goods.  Our 
comparative static analysis shows that the impact of component tariff reductions on the 
firm boundary is ambiguous. However, if we observe particular trends in component trade 
following a tariff reduction, they may enable us to draw some conclusions about what may 
be happening to in-house component production within the MNC. For example, trade 
liberalization which generally stimulates MNCs to offshore sourcing of relatively capital-
intensive activities tends to increase the firm boundary along the extensive margin. In 
contrast, an output tariff reduction allows the North to export final good, while the South 
can expand in-house production.  
 
  32We quantitatively explore some model implications using a previously unused data set on 
the component trade of Toyota in Southeast Asia. The empirical results are broadly 
consistent with the model implications. We find that components with high value or high 
engineering complexity are likely to be sourced within the firm boundary. Differences in 
the quality levels of final products tend to increase the likelihood of intra-firm sourcing. In 
addition, we find that the empirical evidence supports our model prediction concerning the 
effects of input-trade liberalization on the firm boundary. The estimation results show that 
trade liberalization in ASEAN stimulates component imports from Thailand (considered to 
be a relatively advanced automotive producer within the region) by Toyota subsidiaries in 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, and increases the likelihood of intra-firm sourcing. 
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